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STATEMENT OF POSITION
On May 1, 1975, this Court handed down its opinion
in the above-entitled case, holding in effect that prosecutions
for drunk driving under the Utah Motor Vehicle Code cannot
take place in city courts if there is a justice of the peace
nearer or more accessible to the place where the defendant is
arrested (See Appendix "A" for the complete opinion of the
Court).

Respondent, Logan City, has filed a Petition for

Rehearing which is the matter presently pending before the
Court.
The Utah State Association of City Court Judges is,
as its name suggests, an organization consisting of the City
Court Judges throughout the State of Utah,

The members of

the Association strongly feel that the Court's decision
greatly undermines the city court system, that it is contrary
to the best interests of the citizens of this state, and
that the narrow construction given Section 41-6-166, Utah
Code Annotated, is not required by the statute itself, nor
was it construed in harmony with the intention of the legislature.

The City Judges appreciate the leave of court granted

to them to be heard as friends of the Court, and as interested
parties, and hopefully, we might be of assistance to the
Court in pointing out circumstances and considerations which
may have been overlooked.

It will be respectfully urged

that the Court reconsider its decision and grant respondent's
Petition for a Rehearing.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT CITY COURTS DO NOT
HAVE COUNTY JURISDICTION IN ALL STATE TRAFFIC OFFENSES.
A.

Basic Policy Considerations.

In considering

the relationship of an individual member of society to its
-2-

government, it is difficult to conceive of anything more
important than the judicial system.

All of the basic rights

guaranteed by law become meaningless if a tribunal is not
available to dispense justice in an efficient, fair and impartial manner; and yet, because of human frailties, and in
spite of all constitutional safeguards, no judicial system
can ever be better than the judges behind it.. Recognizing
this basic principle, it has always been the strong public
policy of the State of Utah to require its judges to be
trained in the law.

Section 2, Article VIII of the Utah

Constitution requires a Supreme Court Judge to be "an active
member of the bar, in good standing, and learned in the law."
The same requirement is imposed upon District Court Judges
at Section 5, Article VIII of the Utah Constitution.

And,

likewise, City Court Judges are held to the same strict standards and qualifications at 78-4-4 and 78-4-8, Utah Code
Annotated.

Membership in the bar, of course, requires many

years of legal education as well as good moral character and
the successful passing of a difficult examination covering
principles of common law, equity, criminal law and the statutes
and practice of this state (78-51-10, Utah Code Annotated).
The only judicial office to which the above qualifications do not apply is the justice of the peace.

Obviously,

the reason for this exception was simply the practicalities of
-3-

the situation at statehood and the fact that even today there
are many small communities throughout the state where legally
trained people are simply not available.

Certainly it is better

to have good, fair-minded men dispensing justice than to have
no judges at all.

However, it is hardly debatable that effi-

cient judicial administration is best promoted by trained
judges rather than untrained judges.
The above policy considerations have been stressed
because the effect of the Court's decision in this case is to
take away the county-wide jursidiction of city courts in
drunk driving and hit-run cases (which offenses are generally
regarded as the most serious of all traffic offenses and
involve the possible loss of driving privileges as well as
fine and incarceration) and leave them with county-wide jurisdiction of all of the remaining minor traffic offenses.

It

is unreasonable to believe that the legislature could have
intended to give the untrained judges the important cases
and the trained judges the less important cases.

Such result

simply runs against the grain of all logic and common sense.
In the case of Rowley -vs- Public Service Commission, 112
Utah 116, 185 P.2d 514, this Court in stressing the importance
of public policy in the interpretation of statutes stated
as follows:
"* * *Indeed, a purpose to disregard sound public policy must not be attributed to the lawmaking power, except upon the most cogent
-4-

evidence, and it is the duty of the courts to
render such an interpretation of the laws as
will best promote the protection of the public,
insofar as this may be accomplished in accordance with well established rules of construction. * * * In some cases, the words of a
statute may even be restrained or enlarged so
as to comport with principles of sound public
policy. * * *"
The Court further stated that where "a literal interpretation
of the language of the statute gives an absurd result" then
the court will search further for the legislative intent, and
had no trouble in rejecting the literal wording of the statute
in depriving a motor carrier of the right to operate under a
"grandfather" clause of the applicable statute.

See also

Johanson -vs- Cudahy Packing Company, 107 Utah 114, 152 P.2d
98, holding that the literal wording of a statute need not
be followed when to do so would defeat legislative intent
and make the statute absurd.
B.

The Controlling Statutes.

This brings us to the

statute which the amicus curiae believes to be of controlling
importance, namely Section 78-4-16.5 Utah Code Annotated,
Pocket Supp., which provides as follows:
"Whenever a complaint may be commenced
before a magistrate under section 77-57-2,
or an arrested person is to be taken before
a magistrate under section 77-13-17, the
complaint may be commenced or the arrested
person may be taken before the nearest city
court judge in counties where city courts
have been established."
The above statute was passed by the legislature in 1971 and
-5-

is the most recent enactment of the statutes involved.

The

rational of the majority of the court in its opinion in
this case was that the above statute is not applicable because it deals with arrests generally (covered by 77-13-17,
Utah Code Annotated) and not specifically with arrests made
under Section 41-6-166 of the Motor Vehicle Code (See Appendix
"B" for full text of applicable statutes)*

It is contended by

the amicus curiae that such result is not required even by
the literal wording of the statutes.
Section 41-6-166, Utah Code Annotated, requires
that a person arrested for drunk driving be taken to the
nearest most accessible magistrate.

Nothing whatever is stated

in that section as to what the magistrate is to do when the
arrested person is brought before him.
with an offense?

Is he to be charged

Is he to simply be advised of his rights?

Is he to be incarcerated?
Is bond to be set?

Is he to be given chemical tests?

These questions are merely raised to

show that Section 41-6-166 cannot be considered in isolation
or in a vacuum.

It most certainly must be considered in con-

nection with statutes for arrest generally and the general
statutes relating to the procedures and jurisdiction of city
courts and justice of the peace courts. For example, reference
must be made to Section 77-13-17 dealing with arrests generally
to indicate that when taken before a magistrate, a complaint
stating the charge against the person arrested must be made.
-6-

Since Section 77-13-17 and other procedural statutes apply to
arrests for traffic as well as other offenses (otherwise
Section 41-6-166 would be meaningless as no procedures would be
established) the amending statute of 1971, Section 78-4-16.5
would clearly have to apply.

There is absolutely no rhyme or

reason why the legislature would have intended otherwise. Nor
is there anything irreconcilable in the applicable statutes.
Additional rules of statutory construction supporting this
conclusion are to the effect that related statutes should
generally be harmonized with each other whenever possible,
Glenn -vs- Farrell, 5 Utah 2d 439, 304 P.2d 380; also in the
event of conflict, a later statute should prevail over an earlier
statute, P.I.E. -vs- State Tax Commission, 7 Utah 2d 15, 316 P.2d
549.
Another statute which has not been taken into consideration is Section 41-6-169, Utah Code Annotated, which provides that
the provisions and procedures of the Motor Vehicle Code relating
to police officers making arrests without warrants "shall not
otherwise be exclusive of any other method prescribed by law
for the arrest and prosecution of a person for an offense of
like grade".

In light of the existence of this provision in

the Motor Vehicle Code itself, it is not convincing that the
legislature intended to exclude serious traffic offenses from
the 1971 enactment (Section 78-4-16.5) giving city courts
jurisdiction in all cases that otherwise might have been commenced
-7-

before a justice of the peace.
It might also be noted that our sister state of
California has recently held that the permitting of non-lawyer
judges to preside over criminal trials for offenses involving
jail sentences violates the due process clause of the United
States Constitution.

Gordon -vs- Justice Court for Yuba, J.D.

of Sutter City, 558 P.2d 72. The California Supreme Court
reasoned that a non-lawyer is simply not qualified to determine
whether constitutional rights have been violated, to make rulings
on technical questions of evidence, to properly voir dire witnesses, to accept guilty pleas in accordance with constitutional
requirements, and to make proper sentence decisions.

The court

very logically pointed out that if under the United States
Constitution an accused is entitled to be represented by counsel
in misdemeanor cases (Argersinger -vs- Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25,
92 S. Ct. 2006, 32 L. Ed.2d 530) it is even more important that
the judge presiding at the trial be trained and competent.

On

the basis of Gordon, and the authority therein cited, a recent
case was filed in the District Court of Salt Lake County
challenging the constitutionality of the justice of the peace
system in Utah as it applies to criminal trials (Shelmidine, et al.
-vs- Jones, et al., Salt Lake County District Court No. 224948).
On June 3, 1975, Judge Stewart M. Hanson, Jr. handed down a
Memorandum Opinion holding that non-lawyer justices of the peace
could not constitutionally impose jail sentences in criminal
-8-

trials (a copy of the full decision of the Court is attached
hereto as Appendix U C ! I ).

The decision in the Shelmidine -vs-

Jones case will undoubtedly soon be before this Court on appeal.*
While it may be improper for the amicus curiae to get into the
merits of that case, nevertheless it should be brought to the
Court's attention as an additional reason for the propriety of
granting a rehearing.

Also, regardless of the final outcome of

Shelmidine -vs- Jones, the reasoning therein and in the Gordon
-vs- Justice Court for Yuba, supra, is very persuasive as a
simple guide toward finding the reasonable legislative intents
Aside from the fact that statutes are not to be construed in a
manner that makes their constitutionality questionable, it is
simply incredible that the legislative intent of a statute
passed in 1971 could be construed in such a manner as to
restrict the jurisdiction of legally trained judges who conduct
their proceedings in dignified surroundings, and expand the
jurisdiction of the laymen judges, many of whom don't even have
courtrooms.
C.

Other Practical Considerations.

There are still

other practical considerations which the Court may have overlooked.

For example, in Davis County, Utah, there are numerous

towns and cities each having a justice of the peace, as well as
various interspersed and irregular county areas served by a
precinct justice of the peace.

It is not uncommon for individual

justices of the peace to hold court at different places, such as
- 9 -
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at home, or at his place of business, or at the town hall,
whichever is most convenient.

Under these circumstances, it

creates a nightmare for an arresting officer making an arrest
someplace on a freeway to determine which is the nearest most
accessible magistrate.

Must each highway patrol officer keep

daily track of a dozen or more justices of the peace?

Likewise,

it places an unreasonable and unintended burden on prosecutors
in having to establish this as an element of their case. Does
this now become a jury question?

And is the state required now *

to expand its prosecutors so as to try more and more cases in
justice courts, many of which are held only at night since the
justice of the peace may have a daytime job?

These are undoubt-

edly some of the considerations which motivated the legislature
in giving county-wide jurisdiction to city courts. Courts are
to avoid a construction of a statute that will result in confusion or uncertainty.

Masich -vs- United States Smelting,

Refining & Mining Company, 113 Utah 101, 191 P.2d 612.
CONCLUSION
This case is of extreme importance because it reflects
upon the entire judiciary.

It has been said that 90% of the

citizens of our state will never appear in a district court.
The vast majority of persons having contact with the law will
do so in connection with a traffic ticket or a related type of
matter.

The impressions made on the city court level will

-

1

0

-
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largely determine the respect, or lack of respect, that the
community as a whole develops toward all courts and toward the
rule of law that we hold so sacred.

The importance of developing

respect for the courts and of administering justice in dignified
surroundings by competent, well-trained judges is so overwhelming
that it is inconceivable to reasonably ascribe a conflicting
legislative intent.

It should be the policy of this court to

upgrade the judicial administration throughout the State of Utah
wherever possible.

The decision in Wells -vs- Logan City Court

as it presently stands would be a step backward in accomplishing
this objective.

The decision is simply not in the best interests

of the citizens of this state.

It is contrary to the long

established public policy of this state.

It is contrary to any

manifestation of legislative intent, and it is contrary to the
statutes themselves.

The amicus curiae respectfully urges the

Court to reconsider its opinion and grant respondent's Petition
for Rehearing.
Respectfully submitted,

ARMSTRONG, RAWLINGS,
WEST & SCHAERRER
David E. West
1300 Walker Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Utah State
Association of City Court Judges,
Amicus Curiae.

-11-

FOOTNOTE
Since the time of typing the other portions of this
brief, it has been brought to the attention of the amicus
curiae that another petition has been filed in the District
Court of Salt Lake County seeking to prohibit the Murray City
Court from proceeding with a drunk driving case. The reasoning of the petition is that since under Shelmidine -vs- Jones,
justices of the peace can no longer impose jail sentences,
and since under Wells -vs- Logan City a defendant must be
taken before a justice of the peace if he is the nearest and
most accessible, then the punishment for the offense will
depend upon where it took place creating an unconstitutional
discrimination.

If the decision in Wells -vs- Logan City

continues to stand, we may no longer have the offense of drunk
driving in the State of Utah.

-11a-

APPENDIX "A"

John G. W e l l s ,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.

City Court of Logan City, County
of Cache, State of Utah,
Defendant and Respondent,

No. 13824
FILED
May 1, 1975
_ _
Allan E. M e c h a m , Clerk

HENRIOD, Chief J u s t i c e :
Appeal from a denial of a petition to prohibit the Logan City Court f r o m
pursuing a p r o s e c u t i o n on a drunk driving complaint b e c a u s e it had no j u r i s diction under the facts and statutes of this state. R e v e r s e d , with instructions
to grant the petition and i s s u e the writ.
Wells w a s a r r e s t e d nine m i l e s from Logan, Cache County, Utah, but
only one m i l e f r o m W e l l s v i l l e , Cache County, Utah. Both c i t i e s , or t o w n s ,
have m a g i s t r a t e s . * He w a s taken under obvious a r r e s t to Logan, and t i c k e t booked in the Logan City Court, which ticket printedly and p r e s u m a b l y o r d e r *
ed h i m to appear at a date certain to answer, to which ticket he did not c o n sent or sign, although he may have had that opportunity.
H i s attorney appeared s p e c i a l l y and filed a motion to d i s m i s s a c o m plaint b a s e d on t h e s e f a c t s , on statutory grounds, 2 which was denied. The
motion w a s b a s e d on a failure of the arresting officer to comply with a v e r y
s i m p l e statute which s a y s in c l e a r English that if a p e r s o n is a r r e s t e d for
drunk driving by a p e a c e officer, or anyone e l s e , "he shall be i m m e d i a t e l y
taken to a m a g i s t r a t e . . . who has jurisdiction of such offense and i s n e a r e s t
. . . to the p l a c e w h e r e such a r r e s t i s m a d e . " W e l l s v i l l e had such a m a g i s trate, or j u s t i c e of the p e a c e at the t i m e of this a r r e s t .
T h e r e i s no showing h e r e that the W e l l s v i l l e m a g i s t r a t e had gone
fishing, and it should be mandated that peace o f f i c e r s , in light of existing
statutes, should not be free to go fishing for m a g i s t r a t e s * which e a s i l y
could lead to inequity a n d / o r injustice, although there i s no such s u g g e s t i o n
in this c a s e .
%
It i s important to note the complaint filed against Wells w a s laid under
Title 4 1 , Utah Code Annotated 1953, - the Motor Vehicle Code, - not under
Title 7 7 , having t o do generally with m a g i s t r a t e procedural and jurisdictional
matters re m i s d e m e a n o r s as o f f e n s e s , - of which there a r e hundreds and
probably thousands that this w r i t e r intends not to count. But under T i t l e 41 f
there a r e c a r v e d out, in 4 1 - 6 - 1 6 6 , two specific m i s d e m e a n o r s , i. e. , - 1)
driving under the influence, and 2) leaving the s c e n e of an accident, in which
events defined with s o l e m n specificity, in as c e r e m o n i o u s , c l e a r , convincing,
language imaginable, r e q u i r e s that the p e r s o n a r r e s t e d for either of such
c l e a r l y defined m i s d e m e a n o r s "shall be immediately taken before a m a g i s trate . . . n e a r e s t or m o r e a c c e s s i b l e " to "the place where said a r r e s t is
imade . . . . " It i s not the defendant's duty to prove but only to c l a i m that
this v/as not done, s i n c e it is the state's duty to prove beyound a r e a s o n a b l e
doubt that it followed statutory interdictions, - not the defendant's duty to
expend t i m e , money or irritation to prove that the state, of all m o n s t e r s ,
did not c o n c e i v e , nurture, and feed its own offspring.
1.
2.
3.
4.

Weils ville was one of such.
Title 4 1 - 6 - 1 6 6 , Utah Code Annotated 1953.
•
T i t l e s 7 7 - 1 0 - 4 , 5, Utah Code Annotated 1953, 7 8 - 5 - 5 , U. C . A .
Not "may" b e , or in the "discretion of s o m e o n e , " e t c .

1953.

The state 1 s attempt to talk about Title 77 is a diversionary tactic, and
its refusal to talk about Title 41-6-166, is an evasive action that runs procedure and emotion into a questionable judicial cul du sac.
WE CONCUR:

R. L. Tuckett, Justice
Richard J. Maughan, Justice
ELLETT, Justice: (Dissenting)
I dissent. Logan City Court is presided over by a lawyer-judge and has
jurisdiction throughout Cache County. The Wellsville justice of the peace is a
non-lawyer. He likewise has county-wide jurisdiction of misdemeanors. There
is nothing in the record to show where the justice of the peace was at the time of
the arrest or whether he was "available*1 at that time.
The plaintiff alleged in his complaint that he was not taken before the
nearest and most accessible magistrate when he was arrested. It would appear
that he would be required to prove that allegation as a part of his case. By
failing to do so, he was not entitled to prevail in his suit, and the lower court
was correct in so ruling.
The City Court of Logan has jurisdiction of the offense of drunk driving,
and the idea that Mr. Wells should have been taken elsewhere is no defense to
this action. Mr. Wells was taken to Logan in order that a breathalyzer test
could be made pursuant to Section 41-6-44. 10, U. C. A. 1953 (Replacement
Volume 5A), since that is the only place in Cache County where the test could
be conducted. He accompanied the officer there and after taking the test was
released. He was not taken before a magistrate in Logan City or anywhere else*
The prosecution was initiated against Mr. Wells at a later date by the
filing of a complaint and the service of a summons upon him pursuant to
Section 77-12-21, U. C. A. 1 9 5 3 . '
The venue of criminal actions is set out in Section 76-1-202, U. C. A.
1953 (1973 Pocket Supplement). That section sets forth a number of situations
not material here and then in (g) (v) it provides:
For any other offense, tTial may be held in the county in
which the defendant resides, or, if he has no fixed residence,
in the county in which he is apprehended or to which he is
extradited.
It thus appears that Mr. Wells can be tried in any court in Cache County
which has jurisdiction therein, and the misdemeanor charge in the Logan City
Court is properly placed, and the trial thereof should not be interfered with by
this court.
In addition to what is said above, this prosecution is proper in view of
the fact that a new section was added to our statute by Chapter 7, Section 3,
Laws of Utah 1971, which reads as follows:
Whenever a complaint may be commenced before a magistrate under section 77-57-2, or an arrested person is to be taken
before a magistrate under section 77-13-17, the complaint may
be commenced or the arrested person may be taken before the
nearest city court judge in counties where city courts have been
established.

A££end^LJ^l-^ntinHed

. C. A. 1953 as amended (1973 P o c k e t
v-r

A X . .

V

The statute thus gives the officer the discretion and the right to take
a p r i s o n e r to or file a complaint in the nearest city court having jurisdiction
of the offense. The defendant herein was the only city court in the county.
The other m a g i s t r a t e s w e r e m e r e town j u s t i c e s .
The ruling of the t r i a l court in my opinion was c o r r e c t and should
be affirmed*
Crockett, J u s t i c e , concurs in the views e x p r e s s e d in the d i s s e n t i n g opinion
of Mr, Justice Ellett.

APPENDIX "B"
TEXT OF STATUTES
41-6-166:

Appearance Upon Arrest for Misdemeanor

Whenever any person is arrested for any violation of
this act punishable as a misdemeanor, the arrested person
shall be immediately taken before a magistrate within the
county in which the offense charged is alleged to have
been committed and who has jurisdiction of such offense
and is nearest or most accessible with reference to the
place where said arrest is made, in any of the following
cases:
(1)

When a person arrested demands an immediate
appearance before a magistrate.

(2)

When the person is arrested upon a charge of
driving while under the influence of intoxicating
liquor or narcotic drugs.

(3)

When the person is arrested upon a charge of
failure to stop in the event of an accident
causing death, personal injuries, or damage
to property.

(4)

In any other event when the person arrested
refuses to give his written promise to appear
in court as hereinafter provided, or when in
the discretion of the arresting officer, a
written promise to appear is insufficient.

77-13-17:

l

Duty of Arresting Officers Without Warrant—Delivery
of Prisoner—Complaint—Duty of Magistrate

When an arrest is made without a warrant by a peace officer or private person, the person arrested must, without unnecessary delay, be taken to the nearest or most accessible magistrate in the county in which the arrest is made, and a complaint, stating the charge against the person must be made *
before such magistrate. A conductor or other person who
makes an arrest as provided in Section 77-13-5 shall, without unnecessary delay, take the person so arrested before
any accessible magistrate or deliver him to a peace officer?
and a complaint stating the charge against the person must

Appendix "B" Continued

be made. The magistrate before whom such charge is made,
if the offense is triable by him, shall have full jurisdiction over the offense and the defendant to try and determine
such offense. If he has not jurisdiction to try the defendant for the offense charged, he must proceed as provided in
chapter 15 of this title.

APPENDIX " C "

IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAIl

LARRY J. SliELMIDINL and JOHN F.
REEVES, on their own behalf and
on behalf of all others similarly
situated in Salt Lake County,
Utah,
Plaintiffs,
CliARLENE POLLY COOK,
Intervening Plainti:
MEMORANDUM DECISION
vs.
CHARLES A. JONES in his capacity
as Justice of the P^ace of
Precinct 4 of Salt Lake County,
Utah; LYUW D. BERNARD, RALPH
GUILDS, LYLE GUNDERSOM , WAYNE
GUNDERSON, GERALDINL CIIRISTENSKN ,
HENRY U. PRICE, WARREN D. COLE,
REX C. CONRADSON, LLMAR L.
JOHNSON, all in their capacity as
Justices of the Peace, for
Precincts in Salt Lake County,
Utah,

Case No. 224943

Defendants.

Plaintiffs challenge the practice of permitting non-lawyer justices of the peace to hear misdemeanor
cases in 'v/hich a jail sentence could be imposed.
challenge in founded upon three bases:

This

That Due Process

under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United
States Constitution requires that judges in criminal cases
in v/hich imprisonment may be imposed be lawyers; that the
practice of permitting most'of the justices of the peace
1

C'-jcticn 7ft-f>-". , !it:ah Ccd^ 'Annotated, provides that:
"Ju-trees' courts have jurisdiction oz the
t^llov/ing public offenses committed v/ithin the respec' -• * — " M * - i ,.<-. Ir» v/hich such courts are established:

tmroucj.iuuL. ui'j out.iv--. ^^ *^w a.^

—j

time requiring there judges of the city courts, whose jurisdiction is the same as the justice courts with regard to
this type of offense, be lawyers, constitutes a denial of
equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment of the
Constitution of the United States; that the right to counsel
and, more fundamentally, the right to a fair trial, mandated.
by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the.Federal
Constitution are abridged and denied by allowing non-lawyer
or lay judges to preside in any criminal case in which a
jail sentence may be imposed.
By virtue of the foregoing assertions,
plaintiffs are asking this Court to prohibit the defendants,
each of whom is a ncn-lawyer or lay justice of the peace,
from hearing cases involving the plaintiffs in which each
plaintiff is chargeu with the commission of a misdemeanor
offense, the conviction of v/hich could result in imprisonracnt/

Both plaintiffs and defendants have moved for

summary judgment and, to that end, have stipulated that

}

discharge of his duties or to have been
committed with such intent as to render
the act a felony.
- ,
(3)
Breaches of the peace, committing a wilful
injury to property, and all misdemeanors
punishable by a fine less than $300 or by
imprisonment in the county jail or municipal
prison not exceeding six months or by both
such fine and imprisonment."
Section 76-3-7*01 provides that a fine of $299 may be
imposed upon a conviction of a Class ii or C misdemeanor or infraction. Section 7G-3-2CM provides that
the sentence '"or a Class 1' misdemeanor may be for a
term of imprisonment not exceeding %six months and
for a Class C misdemeanor tor a term^not exceeding
90 dayr.. Unci^r Section 70-3-205, no person convicted
of an infraction may be imprisoned.'
Piaintiffs Sh^imicine and Reeves are charqec with the
,—: r-..-. of r-rivrae under the influence of intoxicating

facts are more fully set out in the memoranda filed by the
respective parties v;ith two minor exceptions noted in the
record during oral argument, about which there is likewise
no dispute which raises any issue of fact.
Justice of the peace courts in Utah, manned
by non-lawyer judqes, are courts of convenience, particularly
in isolated rural areas typical of most of this state in
which there are few, and sometimes no attorneys.

In the

early days of statehood there were so few attorneys and such
qreat distances to be covered by those attorneys v/ho v/ere
available that the system of justice in dealing with m i n o r
criminal offenses would have broken down corapletelv if
lawyer judges had been required.

Thus, while city court,

district court and Supreme Court judges were, from the
inception of statehood and before, required to be lawyers,
both wive Constitution of the state of Utah and legislative
enactment left open'the question of qualifications of the
judges of justice courts with respect to legal background
anc* ci~ a.*.miic[«
Modern transportation and communication
have considerably alleviated much of the probl-era earlier
encountered in effectuating a viable means of administering effective and speedy justice on the misdemeanor level*
nevertheless, of the 29 counties in Utah there are still
eight counties with two o'r less resident attorneys and
five e'euntics with no resident attorney, for lawyers, whose
l.ive bincoc: i': dependent upon the service:;" they arc able to
render' to people, have tended to settle in the more popu-r 4'^ v '"--»-.->

y-r-c^-A rincr the inhabitants in

ii>ua;

c^t.cio

uv

LictVUi

legal counsel.

iiUiUtJ
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The impact of this on the administration of .

misdemeanor offenses -- the very type of offense v/ith which
a limited-jurisdiction, lay justice of the peace most frequently deals -- is immediately apparent: ..One-third of the
counties of the state do not have enough resident lawyers
to staff the justice courts and still have a prosecutor and
defense counsel.

In Salt Lake County, where the heaviest

concentration of lawyers is found, only one justice court
judge is a lawyer.
Kith this background, the question before
this Court is whether the historically convenient and
necessary lay justice of the peace system in Utah can
withstand the developing mandates of Due Process, of fundamental fairness and of equal protection.

The basic predicate

is not whether a lay justice of the peace can conduct an
error-free trial or whether he is capable of being fair and
impartial, for Due Process does not guarantee an error-free
trial, Koberts vs. New York City 295 U.S. 264
L.Ed. 2d

S.Ct.,

(1934) , nor does this Court have any doubt

that for the most part lay justices of the peace are fully
capable of fairness and.impartiality.

Rather, it is whether

a non-lawyer judge has sufficient legal training, background
and experience to afford a misdemeanant a fair trial, the
end result of which may-be imprisonment.
1

In this context,

fairi.e:,:;" (iocs not mean merely impartiality.

Its meaning

is of constitutional necessity more encompassing.

It alludes

to a quality.of. justice which fully observes all rights,
both • substantive 'and procedural, of the citizen-defendant

inwhich he lives, no matter how petty.

Ideally, one.would

hope for an entire judiciary staffed with learned judges
who, by intellect and passion, are able to discern the
delicate and subtle nuances extant in our constitutional
system by which the rights of the individual are balanced
against the power oi: the government.

While the ideal may

not be perfectly mot, we come as close as humanly possible
by imposing rigorous standards of training, background,
experience and temperament on our judges to achieve the
highest quality of justice possible.

To impose less than

that does not meet the fundamental constitutional requirements of Due Process for a constitutionally fair trial
where loss of liberty is a possible consequence.

Due

Process permits no compromise between fundamental rights
en the one hand and convenience or necessity on the other.
If one is entitled, under the growing
concepts of Due Process and fair trial, to legal counsel
in a misdemeanor case where there is a possibility of
imprisonment, Argersinger vs. Hamlin, 4 07 U.S. 25, 9 2 S.Ct.
1006, 32 L.Ed. 2d 530 (1972), see also Gideon vs. Wainwright,
372 U.S. 335, 33 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed. 2d 799.(15T>3), then
",ue Process, the right to a fair trial and the right to
counsel likewise mandate that under such circumstances only
w lawyer-judge, qualified by training, background and
•experience to comprehend and utilize counsel's legal argu::-.-n'LG, can impose a sentence of imprisonment:, Gordon vr:.
::

_r::L:L^? .f^-J-'

n : > Cl1

- Kptr. G22, 12 Cni . 3d 323,

5j3 P.!.; 7 2 '19 7 4), *:crt. cen. 16 Cr.L. 14 83, 1484 (1975).'
Trie e-.:fendants nevertheless argue that the

of an appeal "anew" to a .lawyer judge, and thus saves the
system from any constitutional infirmity.

But must a

defendant incur the added expense, both in time and money,
of an appeal in order to be afforded Due Process?
net.

I think

The availability of a trial <^e_ novo on appeal docs

not guarantee a fair trial in. the justice court, the court
with which we are here dealing.

Plaintiffs are entitled to

Due Process and a fair trial in the first instance.
vs.

Ward

Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 93 S.Ct. BO,

34 L.Ed. 2d 267 (1972).
This Court therefore finds and holds that
the practice under Utah law which allows non-lawyer or
lay justices of the peace to impose a jail sentence or
imprisonment constitutes a denial of a criminal defendant's
right to a fair trial in violation of the mandate of the
Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution
of the United States.

To the extent that Section 78-5-4,

Utah Code Annotated, authorizes lay justices of the peace
to impose imprisonment, it, too, is violative of the
guarantees under the Federal Constitution of Due Process,
of the right to fair trial and of the right to^counsel,
and is void."-'

.'
Accordingly*,' defendants1 motion for summary

judgment is denied, plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment
.1

.

is partially4 granted, and the defendants are prohibited
It is unnecessary lo address the que.::;Lion of whether
a U\y judge can impose a fine since tj\e only matter
presently before this Court is whethcor a lay judge
r.c.n afLect the "liberty" of "a defendant bv imprison•'•••'. It is granted "partially" because, while the plaintiffs
l
-- • — — * s •; - rv^nrt- prohibit tne defendants from

as J.ay juuqer. irom ...

iVV^O

-*- .

u::on a conviction of the offenses over which they otherv/ise
have jurisdiction.

Counsel for the plaintiffs are directed

to prepare and submit an Extraordinary Writ in the nature
cf prohibition in accordance with this memorandum decision.

Dated this 3rd day of June, 1975.
BY Tiiii COURT:

a
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Stcw-art M. Hanson,
D i s t r i c t Judge/

Jr,

X"

i

;Xi!/rg?

\ v.
)
"">

er

^ V"\ . - . - .

^*\i isEST
^ ^ i ' i ^ A ^

C'-T^'yT'.'i^v""

